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Ecosystem services approaches are an increasingly popular paradigm for conceptualizing the 
relationship between the environment and human wellbeing (Adams, 2014; Díaz et al., 2015; 
Redford and Adams, 2009). However, there are several theoretical and empirical gaps in how 
ecosystem services scholarship treats access to benefits. In particular, an overt focus on the 
aggregate availability of ecosystem services (Wieland et al., 2016) has obscured both the role 
of people and institutions in coproducing ecosystem services (Palomo et al., 2016) and the 
uneven distribution of benefits, thereby also obscuring the implications of uneven access to 
ecosystem services for poverty alleviation and equity (Bennett et al., 2015; Fisher et al., 
2014). To better conceptualize how people access benefits from ecosystem services, 
ecosystem services scholars have turned to political ecology, and particularly the theory of 
access. The theory of access emphasizes that people’s ability to benefit from things (i.e. 
natural resources) ultimately derives from a range of social, cultural and economic factors, 
beyond solely legal or property rights. Thus, analysis of access seeks to 
‘understand why some people or institutions benefit from resources, whether or not they have  
institutionally recognized rights to them’ (Ribot and Peluso, 2003: 154; emphases in the 
original). Access theory emphasized that, rather than formal property rights alone, people 
benefit from natural resources through a web of means, processes and relations. These means, 
processes and relations were called access mechanisms. Scholars drawing on access theory 
seek to understand how these ‘webs of power’ over a given benefit are created, maintained or 
controlled, often across large-value chains within broad-scale political economies (Beitl, 
2012; Ribot, 2009). 
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Ecosystem services scholarship has increasingly embraced the theory of access, with a 
growing number of studies explicitly examining access to ecosystem services (e.g. Berbés-
Blázquez et al., 2017; Hicks and Cinner, 2014; Lakerveld et al., 2015; Wieland et al., 2016). 
For example, along Canada’s east coast, geographic location, technical capacity, markets and 
user conflicts, and (mis-)management are all potential barriers to First Nations people 
benefiting from shellfish (Wieland et al., 2016). Further, as well as drawing on access theory, 
ecosystem services scholarship has extended it, by examining what aspects of wellbeing are 
supported by different constellations of access mechanisms (2017). For instance, Berbés-
Blázquez et al. (2017) suggest that the farmers in Costa Rica who pursued the conventional 
model of plantain production may place greater value on securing material dimensions of 
wellbeing, while those maintaining traditional practices may do so to maintain a sense of 
belonging and indigenous identity. 
 
However, the underlying theories of power employed in ecosystem services to date, limit the 
ability for the framework to engage in the dynamic and relational ways that institutions gain 
legitimacy to shape access. Specifically, the ideas of entanglement (from anthropology) and 
legitimacy (from sociology and political ecology) can help ecosystem services extend the 
treatment of power beyond ‘power over’–whereby power resides in stakeholders who have 
the ability to wield it to their interests (Berbés-Blázquez et al., 2016)–to a relational 
definition of power that recognizes power as dispersed throughout society (Foucault, 2008). 
The former approach defines power as a zero-sum game, whereby power is wielded over 
others or over resources. In the latter approach, power ‘circulates and is exercised rather than 
possessed’ (Deveaux, 1994, p. 231, emphasis in original). Thus, rather than power residing in 
individuals or institutions (e.g. Berbés-Blázquez et al., 2016; Felipe-Lucia et al., 2015), 
power is constantly reconstituted in the relationships that emerge between individuals and 
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institutions. Taken in this sense, power is a ‘relational effect of social interaction’ (Allen, 
2011, p. 1), rather than an existing ‘thing’ which can be wielded or held. Both structural and 
relational forms of power are alluded to in Ribot and Peluso’s original theory of access 
(2003); power was broadly defined as both the capacity for actors to affect others’ practices 
and ideas, and as inherent and emergent in relationships, rather than attached to people 
(2003). We argue that the latter definition has not been adequately incorporated in ecosystem 
services approaches to access.  
 
We contend that examining entanglement and legitimacy can deliberately move beyond a 
definition of power as static or absolute, to capture the dynamic and fluid landscape in which 
ecosystem services are co-produced. The idea of entanglement describes how, rather than a 
linear progression from customary or traditional systems towards modernity (e.g. Rostow, 
1971), different parts of customary and modern systems ‘entangle’ to create multiple forms 
(Erazo and Jarrett, 2017). Legitimacy and legitimation are seen as a specific form of power 
that comes from how actors and institutions justify what is or what should be, through moral 
values and discourses (Hall et al., 2011). Thus, the aspects of modern and customary systems 
the persevere when the two entangle, depend on what is successfully legitimized. Theories of 
entanglement and legitimacy are explored in more detail in the following section.   
 
Better understanding the legitimacy and entanglement of institutions shaping access to 
ecosystem services is particularly important in developing coastal and marine contexts. The 
ways that customary institutions change, will re-shape people’s ability to and means of 
benefiting from coastal ecosystem services. What is interesting for scholars of ecosystem 
services in particular, is how, when and what parts of customary or traditional systems retain 
legitimacy in the face of this entanglement, what might these mean for access to resources, 
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and by extension, different peoples’ wellbeing. Although understanding how informal rules 
and norms shift with changing economic, social, environmental and political forces has long 
been the remit of political ecologists (Berry 1992; Elmhirst 2011; Peluso 1996), ecosystem 
services are only just beginning to incorporate this fluidity (Lakerveld et al., 2015). 
 
In this paper, we aim to extend and deepen the ecosystem services literature’s treatment of 
access to marine and coastal provisioning ecosystem services and better understand the 
dynamism of access mechanisms at a local-scale, with a particular focus on changing 
customary institutions. We focus on customary institutions in particular because of their 
prominence in our study site and because one of the few existing studies on access to marine 
and costal ecosystem services (i.e. Hicks and Cinner 2014) suggests that institutions and 
social relations are important in coral reef contexts. Thus, although we describe a range of 
access mechanisms, we aim specifically to investigate how institutional mechanisms a) shape 
access, and b) might be more rigorously conceptualized by drawing on theories of legitimacy 
and entanglement. We take a case study approach with the aim of contributing to the growing 
number of ecosystem services studies of localized social processes shaping access to benefits 
that can be obscured in large-scale studies (Berbés-Blázquez et al., 2017; Lakerveld et al., 
2015; e.g. Milgroom et al., 2014; Wieland et al., 2016). We ask, what are the constellations 
of social, economic, and institutional mechanisms that enable or hinder access to a range of 
marine and coral provisioning reef ecosystem services? How are these constellations shifting 
as different elements of customary institutions gain or lose legitimacy in the process of 
entanglement with modernity? 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. We begin by outlining theories of entanglement and 
legitimacy in depth, and then introduce our case study site - a low-lying atoll community in 
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Papua New Guinea - and methods. We present our results thematically. First, we broadly 
describe access to ecosystem services across marine ecosystem services value chains; the 
range of activities that bring a service from catch or extraction, through production, to 
consumption and disposal (Kaplinsky and Morris, 2000). We contextualize the socio-
economic shift towards a cash economy through a description of market access mechanisms, 
before examining entangled customary institutions at the catch stage of the value chain. 
Finally, we situate these findings in broader questions about the co-management of small-
scale fisheries, the changing nature of access, and how to theorize legitimacy of institutions 
in ecosystem services. By investigating how institutions retain or lose legitimacy to shape 
access to a range of ecosystem services, and for whom, we aim to help ecosystem services 
approaches navigate shifting governance of ecosystems at a local level, and identify points 
across value chains where intervention may improve wellbeing (or be more equitable, or have 
fewer ecological consequences); crucial in a period of global social and environmental 
change. 
 
2. Theoretical background: Modernity, entanglement, and legitimacy 
 
Theories of entanglement and legitimacy can further extend ecosystem services’ approach to 
access, especially in contexts where customary and modern uses and practices around 
resources co-exist. Theoretical progress in anthropology emphasizes that customary systems 
are ‘entangled’ unevenly with modernity. The task of defining the characteristics of 
modernity is beyond the scope of this paper (and the topic of much theoretical debate). 
Broadly, the modern and modernity is conceptualized as an extension of the ideals of the 
industrial era, with features (both symptomatic and constitutive) including scientific 
rationality, individualism, commitment to progress, and capitalist-based forms of exchange 
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(Pratt, 2002). The project of modernity (and capitalism) has been to move towards 
universalizing relationships of exchange as a framework for power (Tsing, 2005). However, 
rather than a set, and unchanging configuration of specific relations that constitute the 
‘modern’, social theorists and geographers have emphasized how contemporary societies 
continually make and re-make ‘a multiplicity of cultural programs’ (Eisenstadt, 2000, p. 2). 
This idea of ‘multiple modernities’ posits that rather than a clear-cut dichotomy between 
traditional and modern, modernities manifest in multiple ways, never completely consistent 
or coherent. Rather than being superseded, customary systems and the values and social 
relations they underpin, endure in new configurations, as they meet with global changes 
(Arce and Long, 2000; Erazo and Jarrett, 2017; Filer, 1997; LiPuma, 2000).  
 
The idea of entanglement emphasizes how coexisting modern and customary forms shape 
and reshape one another through conflicts and clashes. Entanglement thus refers to how ‘new 
forms of relations weave their way into and throughout existing ones, pushing them out of the 
way or bending to accommodate them’ (Stead 2013:19). This process has also been thought 
of as ‘friction’, whereby ‘cultures are constantly co-produced… [through] the awkward, 
unequal, unstable, and creative qualities of interconnection across difference’ (Tsing, 2005, p. 
4). For instance, in West New Britain and Oro, Papua New Guinea, customary land tenure 
rights have been able accommodate the changes brought by growth in the oil palm, not 
through the commodification of land, but rather through new forms of tenure arrangements 
that reflect and draw on prior customary tenure rights embedded in social relationships 
(Curry and Koczberski, 2009). In Lihir, Papua New Guinea, the establishment of a nearby 
goldmine and consequent commodification of sea access resulted in a shift in the meaning 
and strength of customary land-ownership, clan belonging, and marine tenure rules 
(Macintyre and Foale, 2007). Thus, entanglement captures how local practices and values are 
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the outcomes of continual tensions between the customary, and the modern, and are not 
easily characterized as one or the other.  
 
Whether and how different parts of customary institutions endure in their entanglement in 
modernity is linked to legitimacy (or the power of legitimation). Legitimation refers to the 
process of justifying ‘what is or… what should be and appeal[ing] to moral values’ (Hall et 
al. 2011: 18). Legitimation, and the resulting legitimacy of different forms of regulation or 
market forces or customary institutions, is therefore itself a form of relational power that 
shapes access and exclusion to resources (Hall et al. 2011). Legitimation is a relational power 
because it is through conflict and interplay of different discourses and values that access or 
exclusion are legitimized or not. Thus, the legitimacy of customary or other management 
institutions rests on more than legal codification. Instead, legitimacy depends on whether an 
institution meets the standards set by the moral principles and values held by those abiding by 
it, and by extension, whether the authority or institution they comply with acts in a way 
congruent with these values (Haugaard, 2008; Jentoft, 2000). In an extension of access 
theory, political ecologists argue that the legitimacy of institutions and governance systems is 
constantly established and re-established through conflict and negotiation (Sikor and Lund, 
2009). This dynamism means that ‘not all forms of power to decide who gets access to what 
resources and benefits, and on what terms, are legitimized with equal effect’ (Sikor and Lund, 
2009, p. 2). Thus, how aspects of customary institutions are legitimized or not, reflect 
dynamic and context-specific power relations or ‘entanglements’.  
 
3. Background and case study 
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Our case study focuses on access to marine ecosystem services in a coastal community in 
Papua New Guinea. Coastal and marine ecosystems are crucial for the wellbeing and food 
security of millions of people in coastal communities and small-scale fisheries (Selig et al. 
2018), but face the challenges of vast ecological change and depletion (Barbier, 2017), in the 
context of shifting institutions (Schlüter et al. 2013) and governance (Song et al., 2018). 
Many small-scale fisheries are navigating changing configurations of customary and formal 
management (Aswani, 2005; Evans et al., 2011), particularly those at the frontiers of marine 
commodity expansion (Fabinyi et al., 2019). Changes in access will have implications for the 
interrelated ideals of sustainability (Steffen and Stafford Smith, 2013), wellbeing (Berbés-
Blázquez et al., 2017), equity (Fisher et al., 2013; McDermott et al., 2013), and adaptive 
capacity (Cinner et al., 2018). 
 
Across the Pacific, customary and modern ways of being are often very entangled. Shifts in 
customary management systems – in the form of sea-tenure, closed systems, taboo areas, 
socially-differentiated uses of species – have been documented since at least the 1970s 
(Hickey, 2006; Hviding, 1998; Johannes, 1978; Macintyre and Foale, 2007; Robbins and 
Wardlow, 2005). Yet, even as they become increasingly entangled with the socio-economic 
shifts accompanying capitalism and modernity, customary systems continue to shape local 
existence, including resource use and rights, in changing forms (Aswani, 2002; Curry et al., 
2012; McCormack et al., 2013). In the late 1990s, overlays between traditional and modern 
fishing rights and sea-tenure complicated the distribution of benefits from baitfish royalties, 
across the western part of Manus province, Papua New Guinea (Otto, 1997). Thus broadly, 
customary systems are re-worked to face the new requirements and desires wrought by cash 
economies and development across the Pacific (Curry et al., 2012; Patterson and Macintyre, 
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2014), and it makes little sense to categorize land and sea tenure systems as either wholly 
customary or wholly modern.  
 
Our in-depth case study is from Ahus island, a low-lying atoll, north of the Manus island 
mainland in the Manus province of Papua New Guinea (see Figure 1). Ahus island is 
particularly pertinent to understanding access, because historically, the use of the surrounding 
sea has been governed by a complex customary sea-tenure system (Cinner, 2005; see also G. 
Carrier, 1981, for a description of the sea-tenure arrangements of the nearby island, Ponam; 
and Otto, 1997 for a description of sea-tenure in Manus more broadly). Ahus has a population 
of approximately 750 people (including children), and has been identified as highly 
vulnerable to climate change (Maina et al., 2016), particularly sea-level rise. Like many other 
parts of Papua New Guinea, Ahus has a clan system, with a customary clan leadership, that 
intersects with elected officials (local level government representatives), and a local ward 
development officer. Although the people of Ahus are predominantly fisher-folk, there are 
many highly-educated Ahus islanders who have migrated to pursue careers in capital cities 
(as business-folk, teachers, pilots, carpenters), and send remittances home. These migrants 
have supported numerous community projects to improve people’s living situation on Ahus.  
 
Ahus islanders have a mixture of cash economy, and local, customarily managed subsistence 
fishing. Ahus islanders catch reef and pelagic fish (using a variety of methods and technology 
including spear-fishing, trolling, and line fishing), glean molluscs and echinoderms 
(including shells, octopus, sea cucumbers), harvest coral (although rarely), and hunt larger 
animals including turtles, dugongs and, opportunistically, dolphins. Fish are usually boiled or 
smoked to be eaten, shared, or sold at local, mainland, or provincial markets. Molluscs are 
also eaten or sold for meat (octopus or clam shell), as shell handicrafts including necklaces, 
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headbands, wrist-bands and belts, or purely as shells (in this case of trochus shells). Sea 
cucumbers are sold to middle-men when the fishery is open. Turtles were traditionally hunted 
for special religious and customary occasions (e.g. St John’s day, funerals, weddings), and 
are now also sold at market. Ahus is approximately a thirty minute boat ride from the 
provincial capital, Lorengau. Aside from weekly markets in Lorengau, there are weekly 
markets held on the island, and in a neighbouring village on the mainland. 
 
Figure 1 Location of Ahus Island, Manus Province, Papua New Guinea.  
 
4. Methods  
 
We used a qualitative mixed-methods case study approach (Bernard, 2017; Flyvbjerg, 2006; 
Mason, 2006) including 30 semi-structured interviews with a range of community members 
conducted by the first author in 2016 (over two months) and again in 2018. Interviewees 
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were purposefully selected in liaison with clan chiefs, the local ward development officer, 
and local research assistants to ensure a mixture of ages, genders, fishing style, wealth and 
clans. Interviewees were purposefully selected to gain perspectives across gender, age, and 
clans. We also conducted informal interviews, and participant observation in reef harvesting 
activities, at local, mainland and town markets, and at homes. Interviews were conducted in 
Tok Pisin by the first author, transcribed and translated by a native speaker of Tok Pisin and 
checked by the first author. In interviews, we asked people to describe practices of extraction, 
(i.e. fishing, gleaning, harvesting), transporting and marketing, and the formal and informal 
rules about physical access to the sea-scape, as well as the barriers and enablers they 
perceived to benefiting from marine provisioning services. We asked about gender specific 
activities related to marine resource use (e.g. shell-jewellery making), gendered divisions of 
labour and space, the use of marine resources in important cultural events (e.g. Church 
events, weddings), and how customary management systems had changed. The first author 
also compiled detailed fieldnotes (Emerson et al., 2011) during her stay on Ahus island, on 
community markets, daily life, gleaning, fishing, jewellery making, sharing and bartering. 
 
We coded interviews thematically (Flick et al., 2013) around access mechanisms identified as 
relevant to coasts and small-scale fisheries (Table 1, see Appendix A for details of qualitative 
analysis), which access mechanisms were identified as enablers or a barriers to benefiting and 
how, who this applied to, and how this differed for different provisioning services. In 
addition, we coded for preferred benefits (for example, people mentioned that when they 
were unable to sell fish, they tried to trade it, or brought it home to eat). We triangulated the 
results from interviews with observational fieldnotes, and notes on informal interviews and 
direct observations (Flick et al., 2004). In the following section we present a broad overview 
of key access mechanisms in Ahus island, identify market access as illustrative of 
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‘entanglement’ in Ahus, and finally describe the shifting legitimacy of the customary 
institutions governing catch.  
Table 1 Access mechanisms relevant to coasts and small-scale fisheries loosely categorized (Berbés-Blázquez et al., 2017; 
Brown et al., 2008; Hicks and Cinner, 2014; Ribot and Peluso, 2003). 
Access mechanisms relevant to coasts and small-scale fisheries 
Rights-based Rights-based (legal/ illegal) 
Permits and licenses  
Knowledge Knowledge 
 
Social and institutional 
Social relations (including user conflicts) 
Identity/socially differentiated divisions of labor/ access (e.g. gender, caste) 
Physical ability 





Technical capacity (assets)/ technology (e.g. fishing gear, boats, processing 











4.1 Overview of access to marine provisioning ecosystem services 
 
A constellation of access mechanisms shape how Ahus islanders benefit from marine 
provisioning ecosystem services (summarized in Table 2). From catching, preparing (by 
smoking or boiling), to eating, contributing to community celebrations, selling, sharing or 
bartering, there are distinct processes around benefiting from each marine provisioning 
service. Different access mechanisms both enable and block who participates in and benefits 
from these processes along the value chains of each ecosystem service (Figure 2). Figure two 
depicts these key access mechanisms along the local fish value chain, and Table 2 includes a 
summary of access mechanisms for marine provisioning services.  
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Figure 2. Enablers and barriers to accessing benefits along the fish value chain. Important access mechanisms are depicted 
below the relevant part of the value chain, and are broadly categorized as institutional, social, economic and contextual. Note 
that these categories overlap (e.g. gender and clan identity define which institutional rules apply to whom). *Access 
mechanisms described in detail in the following sections.  
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Table 2 Key access mechanisms to marine provisioning services, description of how mechanism enables or blocks benefits, the specific ecosystem services each mechanism applies to on which 
part of the value chain. * denotes access mechanisms that have weakened or are uneven, discussed in more depth in section 4.3.2. 
 
Access mechanism Enabler Barrier Ecosystem service Part of value chain 
Rights-based  Illegal to harvest bêche-de-mer (until 2017) Bêche-de-mer Catch 
Social relations Clan relations allow fishing in certain areas, linked to customary 
institutions. Good relations and requesting permission grants 
access.* 
Gender relations within households = gendered division of labour 
(e.g. preparation, markets) 
Shifted social relations = more difficult to barter.  
 
 
All Catch, preparation, 
transport, marketing 
Identity  Gendered and clan-identity based access to reef areas for fishing 
and gleaning (see also customary institutions), gendered division 
of labour across value chain 
Barrier to fishing or gleaning in other clan’s areas* 
 
Fish, molluscs Catch, preparation, 
transport, marketing 
Knowledge Knowledge of areas, techniques, seasons for more effective 
fishing, knowledge of preparation (smoking), knowledge of how to 
make Ahus-style shell jewellery 




Physical access to clan owned fishing areas* 
Rights to certain gears, areas, timing for fishing* 
Deviance from customary rules easier fishing (e.g. diving at night) 
Taboo on collecting bêche-de-mer, trochus shells 
Inability to access another clan’s fishing areas* 
Reef fish, Bêche-de-mer, 
trochus shells, molluscs 
Catch  
Capital Able to purchase fuel to fish, transport to market, or boat and 
motor ownership for trawling for pelagic fish 
Inability to make a profit after transport costs, lack 
of motorized boat a barrier to catching pelagic fish  
Fish Catch, transport, 
market 
Labour Ability to catch, prepare, transport, and market ecosystem 
services. Often a gendered division of labour within families (i.e. 
link to social relations) 




Able to target specific fish (e.g. trawling with boat and motor), 
torch diving at night to target bigger reef fish 
Lack of access to freezers creates time limit on 
selling fish, Low price of trochus shells is unprofitable 
Fish, molluscs Catch 
Markets Temporary middle-man for Tuna (ceased) 
Temporary government-run market with freezers (ceased) 
Over-stock at markets (particularly Lorengau) creates 
a barrier to sell fish for desired price 
Fish Market 
Weather   Inclement weather and large-tides a barrier to 
fishing within and beyond the reef 
Fish Catch 
Physical ability Ability to spearfish deeper, and longer and withstand cold at night.   Large reef fish  Catch 
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4.2 Market access and the entanglement of cash and barter economies 
 
Imperfect market access and the way people navigated their preferences for cash from selling 
fish exemplifies the way that customary (e.g. barter economy) and modern (e.g. cash 
economy) forms are entangled in Ahus island. Many identified a lack of well-functioning 
markets at Lorengau and in neighbouring mainland villages as a barrier to benefits from 
marine provisioning services. Although many Ahus islanders depend directly on fishing for 
their livelihood, many struggle to sell fish when the Lorengau market is overstocked, or when 
customers wait for the price to be dropped at the end of the day. People perceived that market 
volatility and the overstock of fish had worsened. For example, one woman (33) explained 
how her husband;  
 
“gets the fish, I take the fish to the market. When there’s a lot of fish it spoils my chances of 
selling all the fish. Too many fish makes the price drop... there’s not a lot of markets for fish so 
everyone goes to the one place and there is too many people selling fish so the price drops. It does 
not fulfil my intentions/ needs, it does not fulfil the family’s intentions/ needs.” 
 
Women selling fish at the markets in Lorengau sometimes do not obtain their desired price, 
or even recoup enough money to cover the transport costs to and from Ahus.  
 
In the face of an imperfect market, people draw on existing social relations and relations of 
exchange (e.g. bartering) to gain benefits from ecosystem services. Yet, with increasing 
participation in, and preference for a cash economy, the norms and practices of bartering 
have shifted. One woman (50) described how, 
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 “…if one of your friends or sister, brother sees you and says I need this and that, then we will barter 
or change foods. One will say “I have sago” or “I have fish” then we will barter. But it is hard now, 
everyone wants money instead. At the local market, yes it happens, we barter for food but in town it 
is hard at times, they want money. If it is one of your relatives, like a brother or sister, if they wanted 
fish then you barter with other foods.” 
 
People described bartering with people with whom they already have social connections, for 
instance relatives or friends from the mainland who will trade sago or garden vegetables for 
fish. However, bartering is considered second to selling fish for money. For instance, one 
woman explained that she barters with “people from the mainland too, I ask to exchange and 
it helps me out a little bit, so I am not paid for it using money, I change it for some sago.” 
(Woman, 33). Even at local markets in Ahus, or on the mainland, people rarely barter 
straightaway. Rather, bartering becomes a second option when people are unable to sell their 
goods, which they attempt to exchange as the market closes.  
 
This lack of market access may dampen some of the differences in wealth and assets on 
Ahus. Although some fishers in Ahus own motorized boats for trolling, this does not always 
translate into better sales of fish. In interviews, men who owned outboard motors and boats 
expressed particular frustration with the lack of stable markets. For a short time, a 
government sponsored market provided both fish freezers and a stable price for fish 
(determined by weight and grade). However, with no onward buyers, this project failed. 
Thus, lack of market access may curtail the benefits of capital and technology to a degree; 
while owning a boat and outboard motor does enable people to catch bigger and more fish, 
they still face barriers at the market stage. In sum, rather than a perfectly functioning market, 
there is a tension between desired cash benefits, and bartering practices. However now, 
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people tend only to barter with their extended family or friends. In these ways, market access 
exemplifies the way that modernity and custom entangle. 
 
Figure 3. Hierarchy of desired benefits from fish. Fish may either be directly contributed to community events, eaten, 
shared, bartered or marked out for sale. Light blue lines indicate direct benefits, red arrows indicate the choices people make 
if they are unable to sell fish at market, or barter. People rarely prepare fish for the sole purpose of bartering. The need to 
draw on family relationships to barter emphasizes the entanglement of customary and modern modes of exchange.  
 
4.3 Shifting access mechanisms: the legitimacy of customary institutions  
 
Historically, customary institutions shaped who had access to space, species, gears, and times 
for fishing across Ahus island. However, these rules have shifted unevenly for different 
groups of people, and different provisioning ecosystem services. In this section we describe 
the ideal or historical customary rules, before describing changes in their legitimacy and who 
these apply to.   
 
4.3.1 Customary institutions shaping access 
 
For certain parts of the sea-scape (including reefs flats, reef passages, the reef slope, sand 
flats, and reef areas), there are complex customary rules overseen by those in ownership or 
caretaker roles. Within clans, certain sub-clans, families or individuals are responsible for a 
type of method, area, or time, or a combination of these (Table 4). Within sub-clans, families 
or individuals will hold the consanguine role of papa long solwara, (literally father of the 
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sea/reef, figuratively caretaker and steward). With the role papa long solwara come certain 
rights. People hold the rights to close (or ‘tambu’) certain areas or fisheries (e.g. trochus 
shells). Others may have the right to withhold permission from people seeking to use a 
certain method (e.g. diving). For example, different historical fishing methods were ‘owned’ 
by different people or groups, meaning that only they had the right to use them, or to allow 
others to do so (Table 3).  
Table 3. Rights and ownership of traditional fishing methods and which sub-clan, family, or individual within each of the 
four main clans in Ahus holds these rights. 
Traditional fishing method Clan Green Clan Red Clan Blue Clan Yellow 
M'Bruh Large, woven cane and 
banana leaf net cast outside 
the reef - large woven cane 
for turtles/ fish 
Family A Sub-clan i: 
Family B 
Clan C (different 
clan to 
individual C) 
Sub-clans ii, iii, 
iv 
Chur Fire using coconut leaf and 
bamboo inside the reef - 
night only  
NA Individual B Individual C Individual D 
Panho Basket for attracting fish 
'natural FAD' 
Family A Family B Individual C Sub-clans ii, iii, 
iv 
Hu Chasing bait fish into 
traditional net inside reef 
(still used today but using 
net) 
Family A NA NA Sub-clans ii, iii, 
iv 
 
Historically, these customary rights also dictated the types of benefits that were obtained 
from marine provisioning services. For instance, one clan had rights to fishing for bait fish 
that schooled seasonally in their reef flat area using specific nets. Depending on the type of 
bait fish, they were either shared between direct family (including women who had married 
into other clans) or shared out between the four main clans on the island.   
 
Areas beyond the remit of a papa long solwara are open to anyone to use any method at any 
time of the day or night. Clans tend to fish and glean in the areas close to, and owned by, 
their clans; rarely if ever fishing in other clan’s areas. Beyond the reef, the open ocean is 
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broadly considered open to anyone from Ahus, however for both convenience and due to 
social norms, people tended to stick to their side of the island (Figure 4).  
 
Alongside clan sea tenure, is a strong custom of gendered access to the sea-scape. Both 
women and men explained that inside the reef crest is for women, and the open sea is for 
men. This gendered division of space is seen as a combination of respecting customary ways, 
and because women are perceived to lack the strength necessary to paddle canoes in the open 
ocean.  
“The women go to the reef nearby and come back. Where the waves break, that is their boundary where 
they fish. They won’t go further out. The big [deep] ocean and further out is for the men to go fishing, and 
trolling is for the men” (Man, 42).  
 
“I’d say we all just follow our ancestors and customs from before up to now, and [outside the reef] is not 
for us, it’s something for the men only. The men have rights to go dive outside and the women just stay on 
the inside part. And maybe we are not strong enough to go further out and that is why we don’t go further 
out” (Woman, 30). 
 
Customarily, outside the reef belongs to men, and inside to women, although younger men do 






Figure 4 Symbolic and anonymized representation of customary rules and ownership in Ahus, described in Table 4. Colours 
refer to different clans, bold coloured areas represent those areas owned by clan, families or individuals (at different times 
and for different gears – see Table 4 for details), while transparent coloured lines represent the tendency for fishers in the 
open ocean to stay within their sides of the island.  
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Table 4 Selected subset of customary rules and ownership across three clans (anonymized using colours) in Ahus island including the person or group in charge, a description 
of the area, timing, methods, and perceived legitimacy. Outside applicable times the areas and methods are open to anyone, although women glean and fish within the area of 
reef adjacent to their clan, and men tend to fish in their clan’s reef or side of the island. 
 
 
   
Clan Individual or group Area description  Species/ method Times applicable Perceived legitimacy  
Green  Sub-clan A Sandy flat within reef Running motorboat to catch stingrays, 
sharks and turtles  
Day and night 
(full moon) 
Active. People can catch fish or turtles 
opportunistically here if passing through, but 
cannot fish here in this way without 
permission.  
Green Sub-clan B Reef passage A (inside reef) Harvesting fish by chasing them into a 
net strung across passage-way 
Day Still legitimate but no longer coupled with 
active tambus in this area.  
Green Sub-clan C Reef passage B (inside and 
outside reef) 
Harvesting fish by chasing them into a 
net strung across passage-way 
Day As above.  
Green Individual A As above Spearfishing at night Night Often broken. 
Green All sub-clans Behind the reef drop-off (20-
30m) for 500m 
All activities All times Spearfishing was banned but this rule is 
broken.  
Red Sub-clan D As above As above As above A sub-clan from a neighbouring clan shares 
rights to this area.  
Red + 
Yellow 
Individual B (Clan Red) 
Individual C (Clan Yellow) 
Small area within the reef 
(100m*100m) 
M’Bruh fishing (see table 3), line 
fishing 
Night only Not respected.  
Yellow Individual D  
(widow of clan leader) 
Reef flat Very low-tide gleaning with bush knife 
and torch 
Night only Unclear.  
Yellow Individual C Area of reef 40m*100m  Spear-fishing (banned) Night only Not respected but few people go here.  
Red + 
Yellow 
Sub-clan E (Clan Red) 
Sub-clan F (Clan Yellow) 
Beach area in front of clan Net fishing for bait fish  Bait fish seasons Rights to net are only with Sub-clan E in their 
area, and sub-clan F in their area. Customarily 
baitfish were shared but are now also sold.  
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4.3.2 Entanglement and shifts in legitimacy 
 
Access shaped by customary institutions has retained legitimacy for some people within the 
community (e.g. women) and some ecosystem services (e.g. trochus shells, bêche-de-mer) 
and not others (e.g. younger men, reef fish). The complex customary systems that dictate who 
may fish where and how are increasingly fragmented. Specifically, the practice of clan 
leaders and papa long solwara to ban certain practices and areas of aspects of these 
customary systems have lost legitimacy over time as people, particularly young men, break 
the rules (Table 4). The fading legitimacy of customary bans on certain practices is reflected 
in people’s descriptions of ‘stealing’ from others. The notion that fishing another clan’s area 
is stealing suggests that people still hold a sense of rightful ownership, and believe this 
ownership is being violated. Many people argue that population increase, and the need to 
feed one’s family justify this violation. One man (48) explained how everyone was complicit 
in disrespecting customary stewardship of the ocean.  
 
 “There are areas down there where the people from [clan A] go to, and we just follow them and go there. 
The ancestors have their ocean areas where we go looking for fish but now there are too many people we 
do not follow the old ways. We steal from them and they do the same thing here. Now that there are too 
many people, no one listens so we still go diving in the ocean when there are restrictions in place. There 
are so many people that there is shortage of food, and that is why we must still go look for fish or not we 
will starve” (authors’ italics). 
 
Deviance from customary rules is also coupled with physical ability and identity (youth and 
masculinity), both enable some people to benefit more (by catching more, and bigger fish), 
and are also implicated in the shifting legitimacy of customary institutions. Men emphasized 
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that physical ability enabled people dive deeper and for longer periods when spear fishing. 
Being young, fit and able to withstand the cold means that younger men can go spearfishing 
for longer periods, including at night. 
 
“[Older men] are not strong enough to dive at this present time, because they would have to dive 
for long periods, and they are scared of the cold and that’s is why they won’t go to the ocean. 
Because for us, younger men like me, I can dive go all the way there to that point and come back 
to the front of the village. The older men can’t do it anymore, they will just go to the middle or 
half way and they might get cold, the young men are still strong and don’t feel cold and we can 
dive for long periods” (Man, 23).  
 
Clan leaders have been unable to enforce bans in clan-owned deeper passages of the reef, 
because at night, young men spearfish with torches and are hard to detect and also 
impervious to threats of court or other consequences. In one clan leader’s words; 
 
“Both of us [clan leaders] put a tambu on diving at night - that’s our right - but all the youth go at 
night while we sleep. I think that happens often. I’m someone with a short-temper! I’ve fought them 
countless times, but then if I keep doing that I’ll just end up in jail” (Man, 50).  
 
Younger men also more willing to push common boundaries around fishing grounds in the 
day. For instance, one woman described an incident between young men from one side of the 
island, and young men from the other side.  
 
“The young men from here, the boys from the other side went to the ocean and they went fishing there, 
and they [the boys from here] got angry saying you guys should stay in your area and fish in your area” 
(Woman, 47).  
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Young men appear more willing to test the boundaries of customary norms and rules around 
fishing, and less concerned about the consequences of doing so.  
 
In contrast, women continue to fish solely within their clan’s fishing areas. All women 
interviewed noted that they only fished in their clan areas, or, if they had married in from 
another clan, would only return to their original clan’s fishing ground if they received 
permission: 
 
 “My clan, on the other side, they can’t come here to catch fish, etc. We can only find fish on the other 
side. It’s taboo to come here. And it’s the same for here, we go fishing in the area that belongs to us. We 
can’t go fishing or gleaning on the other side. If someone goes fishing here, outside their area, then 
everyone from here will talk, warn them, or take them to court. So we only go fishing, and diving on our 
side” (Woman, 38). 
 
Thus, the customary rules that remain are the looser norms around areas of fishing, and the 
broad ownership (particularly of particular passages), while specific bans no longer retain 
much legitimacy. Women’s use of the sea-scape remains limited by customary systems while 
the stronger restrictions banning fishing using specific methods in certain areas have 
gradually eroded, alongside the custom of asking permission to fish in a clan’s area.   
 
In addition, for some ecosystem services, the continuing legitimacy of customary access is 
shaped in part by legal and market access mechanisms at a broader scale (i.e. national and 
regional) and underscores the usefulness of the idea of ‘entanglement’ for understanding how 
different institutions retain or lose legitimacy for certain groups within communities. 
Customary rules remain strong for several species that are bolstered by broader scale rights 
and market access mechanisms. Specifically, there are strong clan taboos on collecting sea 
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cucumbers (bêche-de mer) and trochus shells. The ban on sea cucumbers aligned with a 
nation-wide moratorium on collecting sea cucumbers (lifted in 2017). At the time of 
fieldwork, no one collected sea cucumbers, because there was no one to sell them to, they 
were tabooed in the customary system. In this way, the customary ban was aligned with and 
gained legitimacy from the government’s moratorium. Access to and benefits from trochus 
shell are likewise still shaped strongly by customary systems. The clan-based taboos on 
collecting trochus shells are strengthened, in part, due to a drop in the price of trochus shell 
(see Appendix B).  
5. Discussion 
 
Our case study emphasizes how entanglement and legitimacy can extend understanding of 
how customary institutions mediate access to ecosystem services in the context of 
environmental and social change. Consistent with a growing number of studies, we found that 
people access a variety of marine ecosystem services through social, economic, and 
institutional mechanisms that have shifted over time (Berbés-Blázquez et al., 2017; Felipe-
Lucia et al., 2015; Hicks and Cinner, 2014; Lakerveld et al., 2015). Here, we highlight 
several key theoretical implications of incorporating entanglement and legitimacy into studies 
of access to ecosystem services, particularly around the extension of power.  
 
Our findings suggest that the legitimacy of customary institutions may change subtly over 
time, be socially differentiated, and impacted by governance at broader scales. In Ahus, we 
found uneven legitimacy in how customary institutions shaped access to marine provisioning 
ecosystem services for different groups of people, and different services. Some benefits from 
some provisioning services are still shaped strongly by customary institutions (e.g. ban on 
collecting trochus and gendered access to the sea-scape), while some are not (e.g. non-
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compliance to gear bans). Customary taboos around harvesting sea cucumbers were 
reinforced by a Papua New Guinea-wide moratorium. However, customary institutions and 
leaders have not retained their legitimacy over the past two decades, in part by ceding their 
power to government elected officials to call community meetings and make binding 
decisions. In our case study, changing legitimacy around customary institutions are less 
obvious and contested than the ‘messy’ battlefield of legitimacy brought about by new 
institutions like payments for ecosystem services (Ishihara et al., 2017). Instead, in Ahus, the 
legitimacy of customary institutions has gradually faded. This change mirrors a more 
creeping change in legitimacy found in an institutional analysis in Hawai’i, where co-
management legitimized different parts of local institutions by recognizing and codifying 
historically legitimate claims and fusing them across governance-scales, within the 
constraints of the legitimacy of previous governance arrangements (Ayers et al., 2018). Thus, 
while we agree that decision-makers must ‘consider historically legitimate claims by actors… 
to manage the landscape’ (Berbés-Blázquez et al., 2017, p. 139), our findings caution that 
what is considered historically legitimate may be contested. The contested nature of 
legitimacy is more readily visible through the relational view of power.  
 
In their original theory of access, Ribot and Peluso (2003) suggest a relational approach to 
power, within a broad definition of power (Myers and Hansen, 2019). Rather than arguing for 
one definition or approach to power, we instead contend that ecosystem services’ studies of 
access (in particular) would benefit from a broader view of power offered by the theory of 
access itself, and the social sciences more broadly (Svarstad et al., 2019). In light of our 
findings, we contend that rather than ‘identifying the stakeholders… who are able to impose 
their views on specific issues related to [ecosystem services] management, elucidating their 
sources of power, and identifying the other stakeholders on which they exercise this power’ 
 27 
(Barnaud et al., 2018, p. 7), examining entanglement and legitimacy extend ecosystem 
services’ treatment of power by incorporating a relational approach to power as well as 
structural approach of ‘power over’. In Ahus, we found an entanglement of different social 
relations around access rather than actors making conscious and calculated bids for control 
over ecosystem services. For example, the decreasing legitimacy of clan leaders, and the 
papa long solwara to enforce use rights in their sea-areas, partly reflects their inability to 
realize values of stewardship rather than their inability to control resources for their own 
direct benefit. The changing identities and masculinities of young men in Ahus challenged 
the legitimacy of customary institutions. In Papua New Guinea, it is likely that the legitimacy 
of customary institutions will be shaped by the changing meaning of labor, and changing 
intergenerational relationships (Curry and Koczberski, 2012). Thus, entanglements of custom 
and modernity reflect entanglements of relationships of power (Sharp et al., 2000). When 
studying access, investigating where legitimacy lies in ‘entangled’ institutions, shifts the 
ecosystem services’ treatment of power beyond embodied, possessed and wielded by 
individuals or institutions themselves, to one where power is emergent (or co-produced) 
through everyday relationships between institutions, people, and ecosystems. 
 
The metaphor of entanglement can also help to conceptualize how power shifts values related 
to ecosystem services. In line with the idea that different values for ecosystem services are 
embedded in changing institutions (Berbés-Blázquez et al., 2017; Pascual et al., 2017), we 
found that the demise of de-jure clan rights to ban access to certain areas of the reef, was in 
part a clash of values over protecting bequest values, the relational values of stewardship, and 
the desire to make a living. In Ahus, there is tension between the desire to benefit monetarily 
from marine provisioning services, a lack of secure and functioning markets to do so, and the 
authority of those historically responsible for the customary management of the reefs. Clan 
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chiefs often expressed a sense of frustration and failure at being unable to enforce closures of 
their reefs, reflecting a decline in relational wellbeing founded on identity and a sense of 
agency (Weeratunge et al., 2014). Stealing fish by breaking traditional tambus and fishing in 
other areas has become a social norm ("they steal, so we steal too"). Many Ahus islanders 
explained these transgressions with narratives of Malthusian overfishing, population growth 
and material needs (Finkbeiner et al., 2017). In Ahus this ‘entanglement’ of priorities for 
material wellbeing (i.e. food and income) and relational wellbeing (i.e. continued customary 
practices around managing the reef, and identities of stewardship) will continue to play out as 
the community faces socio-ecological changes like new markets, or environmental 
degradation. This finding aligns with work in Costa-Rica that found different agricultural 
institutions and access mechanisms cohered around different values (profits versus cultural 
identity and continuity) (Berbés-Blázquez et al., 2017). Given the entanglement of values and 
legitimacy, how and which aspects of institutions retain or lose legitimacy has important 
implications for people’s wellbeing.  
 
Alongside and related to these theoretical contributions, we suggest two key practical 
implications from our case study. First, identifying and understanding how different 
mechanisms enable (or block) benefits from provisioning ecosystem services, can illuminate 
where certain groups might be vulnerable to change in a value chain, and thus where 
development or conservation initiatives might find leverage to change access patterns for 
poverty alleviation and wellbeing. Constellations of access mechanisms shape who is able to 
benefit from marine provisioning services and how they do so. For example, in Ahus island, 
enabling access to motorized boats may alleviate some pressure on reef fisheries, but a lack 
of direct buyers and fish freezers mean that this might not translate directly into increased 
livelihood benefits. Similarly, when the National Fisheries Authority introduced a fish 
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aggregating device (FAD) to Ahus, it helped those without motorized boats to catch larger 
fish but did not enable access to a more stable or lucrative market. However, providing a 
stable or more lucrative market will benefit those with existing capital first; those fishers who 
can both catch and directly transport fresh fish. Providing other fishers with fish freezers, 
however, may also have ecological consequences for the reef (Cinner et al., 2016). Thus, 
investigating access mechanisms across the value chain of marine provisioning services can 
help identify where interventions might be successful or where they may be blocked by 
different barriers to access.  
 
The second key recommendation for practice stemming from our work is that recognizing the 
role that conservation or development practices play in strengthening or undermining certain 
‘entanglements’ can help avoid (even inadvertently) legitimizing inequitable access patterns. 
Development, conservation, and resource management projects themselves entangle in 
different ways with local institutions (Ishihara et al., 2017). Attention to the role of 
conservation projects remains particularly important in community-based natural resource 
management, where the way projects engage with and identify communities may first 
obscure, and then institutionalize socially-stratified and inequitable resource benefits 
(Agrawal and Gibson, 1999). For instance, in the Philippines, efforts to institutionalize and 
foster participation in a state-led program to manage coastal resources, missed the 
opportunity to examine where existing institutions could be strengthened or altered, and 
instead unequally distributed the burdens of the project across class, ethnic, and gender lines 
(Eder, 2005). The metaphor of entanglement gives practitioners and researchers a lens to 
identify where institutions or discourses at different scales, for instance global governance 
and local management (McDermott et al., 2019), may clash, and what this tension might 





Ecosystem services research is beginning to more deeply interrogate the role of power in 
shaping how people access benefits from their environments. Broadly, we found that access 
to ecosystem services within a single coastal community is complex and changing in an 
entanglement of relations from customary and market-based systems. In the context of 
changing patterns of exchange and preferences for benefits, we found that the legitimacy of 
customary systems, and thus their power in shaping access, has eroded around the use of 
space and time for some (e.g. younger men), and less for others (e.g. women). Thus, we argue 
that institutional access mechanisms may be entangled in ways that are socially 
differentiated. We also found that customary access has eroded for some ecosystem services, 
but not for others, emphasizing the way that multiple access mechanisms (e.g. national level-
laws) intersect to shape access at a local level. Identifying what aspects of customary systems 
remain legitimate and which fade can contribute to a relational understanding of power in 
ecosystem services and will ultimately assist more pragmatic approaches to ecosystem 
governance, including the equitable co-management of fisheries.  
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Appendix A Qualitative analysis 
 
We took coded thematically, with codes for benefits derived from an initial reading of the 
interviews, and codes for access mechanisms derived from those identified by Ribot and 
Peluso (2003). Table S1 explains each code and provides an illustrative quote.  
 
 
Table S1. Thematic codes with explanation and illustrative quote.  
 
Codes Explanation Illustrative quotes 
Types of benefits 
Money (sell) Sold for money in village, 
mainland market, town 
market 




market if not sold, or 
before 
“…during the day it’s normal. We go diving and get one or two to eat” (man, 28) 
Barter Fish exchanged for 
garden food (sago etc.) 
“but if not [selling it] I’ll do the barter system and I will change it with another food 
type because I know that I will go back to the ocean and get more fish. So the fish I 





Fish or shells contributed 
to events or a pool of 
money that goes towards 
community projects (e.g. 
building school) 
“When there is a death we will have to go and get fish and there’s ways to do that… 
they [Chiefs/ family] put out the word and… the next day everyone will go and get 
fish from that area. We have celebrations like that.” (Man, 60) 
Share Fish are given away (gift) “if I get a lot or I only get some…if a family member comes along I will still give fish 
to them. Our way in the village is that when someone goes to the reef or I go to the 
reef and someone comes to the village and they want fish I would share it with 
them” (Woman, 27) 
Efficiency/ 
efficacy 
The ability to benefit 
from more effective 
fishing by using certain 
gears/ methods/ areas. 
Often linked to social 
identity, relations and 
customary institutions.  
[Barrier] “Santina and I used the net and the men saw us and reported us to the 
owners [of the net/ area] but we didn’t go to court. They just told us that in our 
custom only the men are allowed to throw the net or to catch fish using the net but 
not the women. And that was the first and last time for me to use the net and now I 
don’t use the net anymore” (Woman, 27) 
Physical access Ability to fish/ access 
certain areas 
“When I go, I go to our part of the ocean that belongs to my family, I won’t go to 
the other side” (Woman, 45) 
 
Access mechanisms 
Rights Legal rights (see 
customary institutions re. 
informal rights) 
“The other things like Beche de mer and all this… when the fisheries department 
gives the ok, then we go and get them.” (Man, 51) 
Capital Money to buy petrol, 
boat fares, or assets (e.g. 
outboard motor and 
boat) 
“If you are fishing for tuna then you go in an outboard motor so you can go out 
there… You can hire boats. There are hire boats that are there or friends who have 
motors and cannot go and do heavy fishing, you can ask them and they will give it 
to you.” (Man, 60) 
Customary 
institutions 
Clan ownership of certain 
areas, gears, times of 
fishing. Many have fallen 
away but fishing on ‘your 
side’ of the island, tends 
to be followed.  
“When the boys from the other side come here to Rai - only the people from Rai will 






Benefiting by disobeying 
customary rules around 
times and places to fish. 
Particularly around diving 
at night, and diving in 
what used to be 
restricted areas.  
“The boys from the other side went to the ocean and they went fishing there and 
[the young men from here] got angry saying you guys should stay in your area and 
fish in your area” (Woman, 45) 
“With diving at night time when people don’t ask and just go swimming in the area 
for fish - we all depend on the ocean and when you go and you get good things - 
and when you don’t ask the owner, the person [owner] won’t agree with that and 
arguments happen.” (Woman, 27) 
Emotional 
circumstances 
Beliefs around emotions/ 
social relations (e.g. 
arguments) and fishing 
“If I argue with a family member I won’t go to the ocean because I will waste my 
time going to the ocean.” (Man, 27) 
Environmental 
circumstances 
Weather, tides, rough 
seas [barriers] 
 
Low tide [enabler] – can 
dive deeper 
“If the water level is high we won’t go. If we go the tides might take us to the big 
ocean and we might die, so if the water level is ok then we will go but not when the 
water level is high.” (Woman, 45) 
“…when the north west winds are here then the fathers and the brothers don’t go 
to the ocean. The shells are for times like that and the women will go collect shells… 
we go collect shells when the weather is bad” (Woman, 27)  
Knowledge LEK, fish seasons, areas, 
patterns, good bait/ gear 
“If I want to look for yellow fin tuna I must go out and I know where the tuna will 
come out from and there are times for the fish to come, weather” (Man, 60) 
Labour To fish, market/ sell, 
collect (shells), smoke 
etc.  
“[Collecting trochus shells] is a combined job for the husband, wife and the children 
and if you have a big family than you are lucky, many hands” (Man, 60) 
Market Over-supplied market = 
key barrier to benefiting. 
Requires transport 
money, and labour 
(women) and is 
unpredictable.  
“A lot of fish go to the market, or we dry the fish or smoke the fish. It’s making 
things difficult for our women here… If only there was a good market and access to 
exporting to other provinces. We can get into selling fresh fish, someone in Ahus 
should be a buyer.” (Man, 60) 
“When there is a lot of fish and we go sell it, people won’t buy the fish” (Woman, 
27) 
“If there is a lot of fish at the market then there is no need to go to the market. 
Sometimes people will buy it and sometimes they won’t because the fish might go 
off.” (Man, 27) 
Technology/ 
gear/ methods 
Gear types, technology 
for catching fish 
(sometimes limitied – i.e. 
barrier) sometimes 
shared innovation (e.g. 
‘chicken feather method’) 
“I must have fishing lines, must have fishing hooks, I must find bait for me to use 
when fishing, and reels.” (Man, 27) 
“we fish out there. Night fishing is with the lamp or torch but that’s this area but 
that area we can’t go - it belongs to the clan from the other side.” (Man, 60) – 
linked to social relations/ clan/ customary rules 
Social identity 
(incl. gender, clan, 
age, family) 
Intersects with customary 
institutions, clan 
ownership (sides of the 
island) and space (men 
outside, women inside 
reef) 
“If I wanted to go and fish over there I would have to go and see the chief over 
there and ask to go and look for fish over there” (Man, 60) 
 
“The custom of the village only men are meant to throw the net but not the 




borrowing things, sending 
fish to market with 
relatives, sharing with 
friends, family 
“You can hire boats. There are hire boats that are there or friends who have motors 
and cannot go and do heavy fishing, you can ask them and they will give it to you.” 
(Man, 60) 
“If I wanted to go and fish over there I would have to go and see the chief over 
there and ask to go and look for fish over there” (Man, 60) 
Combinations 
To identify where 
mechanisms work together  
(e.g. gender and customary 
institutions) 
“If I argue with a family member I won’t go to the ocean because I will waste my time going to the 
ocean” (Man, 27) – customary belief that fishing when in an argument = no fish.  
(social relations, emotional circumstances, customary institutions) 
 
 
Appendix B Access to Trochus shells 
 
Each clan leader has the right to close and reopen trochus shell collection in their clan area. 
During fieldwork, trochus shell collection was banned across the island. Partially, the price of 
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trochus shells had dropped and so the collecting and selling them was not lucrative enough. 
However, the way trochus shells are collected and the socially sanctioned ways of benefiting 
from them, tell a more complex story. When a clan leader decides that it is time to harvest 
trochus shells, he announces it and puts out a marker (usually, a large tree branch, stood up in 
the sand), to mark the boundaries of the clan’s area. Then, over several days, families go 
collecting trochus shells together. Part of the money made from trochus shells is supposed to 
be shared among the community, put towards school fees, rather than solely benefitting the 
family who collected the shells initially.  
 
“All trochus shells across the whole reef are tambu. When they’re alright then people can 
harvest them. It’s because of the price. So, they are waiting for the price and the size to go 
up… Yes, trochus shells used to help us pay school fees. They help to support education. We 
use trochus shells to benefit the children. By collecting and selling it – when they get the 
money they can support their children by getting school fees. And it’s more valuable.” (Clan 
leader, ~60) 
 
‘There are landowners for trochus shells. It belongs to the community… They say that after 3 
or 5 years so trochus shells are ok, and the community goes and gets it to pay for school fees 
for the kids’ (Woman, ~35).   
 
Harvesting of trochus shells is collective, and it is considered appropriate to both share the 
money, put it specifically towards education, or use it to do community work. Yet, this 
customs around trochus shells are entangled with the market system. The decline in trochus 
shell price likely contributes to how strongly people adhere to the island-wide ban. Indeed, in 
interviews, while the tambu on trochus shells was often the only one that people confidently 
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